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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issue^
Did the Transitional Assembly have the Constitutional powers to revise the

Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (the “Old Statute”) 1 without amending the Law of
Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL)?2 What are the
consequences for the New Statute and does it enhance the Tribunal’s legitimacy? 3 See
Chart 1 for a summary of these events in a timeline format.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. The IST is a legitimate court to provide justice for the Iraqis.

^

ISSUE: The Iraqi Governing Council promulgated the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal on December
10, 2003. On March 8, 2004 the Iraqi Governing Council promulgated the Law of Administration for the
State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL). The TAL is Iraq’s Interim Constitution. Article 48 of the
TAL confirms the Statute of the Iraqi Special as “issued on 10 December 2003.” It also declares that the
Statute issued on Dec. 10, 2003 “exclusively defines the [Tribunal’s] jurisdiction and procedures,
notwithstanding the provisions of the [TAL.]” On August 11, 2005, the Transitional National Assembly
promulgated a revised Statute for the Iraqi Special Tribunal which abrogated in full the previous Statute.
Did the Transitional Assembly have the Constitutional powers to do this without amending the TAL itself?
If not, what are the consequences of this decision? If so, does the passage of this new Statute enhance (from
a legal standpoint) the Tribunal’s legitimacy?
1

The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, Dec. 12, 2003, available at http://www.cparaq.org/human_rights/Statute.htm [hereinafter IST Old Statute] [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 13].

2

Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, March 8, 2004, [hereinafter TAL]
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
3

The Iraqi Higher Criminal Court, August 11, 2005 [hereinafter IST New Statute]. Please note that Arabic
is the only official language of the IST and the English translation has been provided as a courtesy for the
international community. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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The Transitional National Assembly draws its legitimacy from international
occupying powers law, the direct-elections nature of the Assembly and the international
recognition given to the Assembly by the international community.
The Hague Convention4 and Geneva Convention IV5 provide the background for
occupying powers law. These conventions define the so-called “conservationist” theory
of allowing the existing laws of the country to stay in place, unless any changes or new
legislation become necessary because of emergencies or other exceptional reasons.6 Iraq
retained its statehood; the coalition forces were an occupying force that transitioned
power to it eventually through an agreed timeline. 7
In the end, the Iraqi Special Tribunal (the “IST” and also known as the Iraqi High
Criminal Court) is a legitimate court because it was established in accordance with proper
methods and standards and it conforms with human rights standards.
2. The change of the Statute from the Old Statute to the New
Statute was an amendment.
The changes between the Old and New Statutes were de minimis; they all dealt
mostly with procedures. The most important substantive portions of the Statute that

4

Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct 18, 1907, Regulations Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631. [hereinafter Hague Regulations]
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab7].
5

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 8].
6

Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 199 (Winter 2005) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 45].

7

CPA, Agreement on Political Process, Nov. 15, 2003. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
1].
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would affect the accused was the list of crimes, and that remained unchanged.8 This
would suggest that the Statute was amended and not replaced.
3. The Assembly was constitutionally permitted to amend the
Statute.
The Statutes emanate from the TAL. Though imperfect, they do have primacy
over all other forms of legislation. There are also mechanisms to amend the TAL.9 This
mechanism was introduced over the protests of the Coalition Provisional Authority
(“CPA”). Even though these amending mechanisms are specific to the TAL, they are
applicable to legislation, including the Old Statute.
There is explicit language in the TAL that the Old Statute exclusively defines its
jurisdiction and procedures.10 But because the TAL is at times self-contradictory, that
provision should not be considered permanent and unchangeable. Instead it is likely that
the Assembly has the authority to amend legislation as part of its function as a law
making body.
4. The Assembly was constitutionally permitted to replace the
Statute.
The Assembly is authorized constitutionally to make changes to its statute
because it is a legitimate body of government and a legitimate legislative body is able to
self-determine aspects of its country’s domestic laws, including penal codes. This
legitimacy comes from international recognition of the Assembly’s legitimacy and also

8

New Statute, supra note 3. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10].

9

TAL, supra note 2, Art. 3. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11].

10

Id. at Art. 48(A).
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the fact that it is a democratically elected body. Furthermore, because the Assembly is
one that works under a TAL that calls for respecting basic human rights; this also adds to
the legitimacy of the organization.
In terms of state succession, the CPA was recognized by the U.N. as the
legitimate occupying force in Iraq. The documents describing the CPA’s dissolution then
give all of its powers to the new Assembly. 11 Legitimacy is therefore transferred through
this process.
Considering the above, the Assembly is authorized constitutionally to make
changes to the Statute. This is because the changes to the Statute are minor, the sources of
legitimacy for the Assembly are just and also because of the right to self-determination.
Moreover, the Assembly may simply amend the TAL and achieve the same result; this is
simply a procedural step that was neglected by the Assembly, which should not
undermine its legitimacy or the legitimacy of the tribunal statute.
5. The directly elected Assembly lends credibility to the legitimacy
of the Tribunal.
The directly elected Assembly is legitimate, and it lends its own legitimacy to the
IST. Furthermore, the tribunal also gains credibility from the Assembly their minor
changes to the Statute making the tribunal a more domestic one in nature. Though there
has been substantial involvement from the U.S. with the IST (the promulgation of the
Statute and the funding of the IST), the Assembly has tried to take ownership of the IST

11

Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 100, CPA/ORD/28 June 2004/100 (June 28, 2004), available
at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040628_CPAORD_100_Transition_of_Laws__Regulations__O
rders__and_Directives.pdf . [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
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by promulgating its own Statute and also making changes to conform more with the Iraqi
expectations. This gives the IST credibility.
6. Iraq and its citizens will face difficulty in healing and preparing
for the future if the Tribunal is found to be illegitimate.
There are three pillars to fight against possible impunity of the perpetrators of the
atrocities under Saddam’s rule: justice, truth and reparations. The retributive theory of
punishment ties in the justice and reparations pillars and is symbolic of the push for the
death penalty in Saddam’s case. If the results of the trial are not achieved in a legitimate
fashion, the future of Iraq is a dismal one, because such a failure will represent a new
roadblock to healing and enflaming existing tension in Iraq.
Additionally, the nascent government of Iraq and the state itself may suffer a
problem of legitimacy if not its stature on the international stage. A common requirement
of international tribunals is that cases may not be brought before it unless all the domestic
remedies are exhausted. In cases where the state is unable or unwilling to try the case,
then it may be brought before the international tribunal. If this were to happen, then the
Iraqi government itself would suffer a public relations problem that would also affect its
attempt to regain any standing on the world stage.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. History12
1. U.S.-invasion of Iraq

12

See generally Chart 1, infra.
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U.S. President George W. Bush announced on March 19, 2003 that a coalition of
forces began striking military targets in Iraq to undermine Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein’s ability to wage war.13 The coalition forces were led by the United States14 and
the United Kingdom.15 The attacks and strikes encountered little resistance and U.S.
forces entered Baghdad less than three weeks after the commencement of hostilities on
April 9, 2003. Five days later, the Pentagon declared that major hostilities were
concluded.16
The CPA announced its own creation to the United Nations in a letter dated May
8, 2003.17 The letter states that “[t]he United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition
partners recognize the urgent need to create an environment in which the Iraqi people
may freely determine their own political future.” To achieve this end, a representative
government was to be formed.18
Meanwhile, Coalition troops searched for Saddam Hussein. Finally, on Dec. 14,
2003, U.S. troops raided a small farm near Tikrit and captured the former-president of

13

Dept. of State, “Timeline of Iraq: 1932-2003,” available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive_Index/Timeline_of_Iraq_19322003.html, (last accessed Oct. 16,
2005). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 61].

14

Fox supra note 6, 202. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45].

15

See “Iraq Coalition Troops Non-U.S. Forces in Iraq - 16 August 2005”, available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm (giving a complete list of non-U.S.
forces in Iraq.) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 66].

16

Id.

17

Letter from the Permanent Representatives of the UK and the U.S. to the U.N. addressed to the President
of the Security Council, May 8, 2003. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 29].

18

Id.
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Iraq, who had been hiding in an eight-foot hole.19 Interestingly, only four days earlier, the
Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (the “Old Statute”) had been promulgated by the
CPA,20 and the beginnings of a transitional government were beginning to take shape.
2. Government creation and Statute change
On November 15, 2003 the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council signed an
agreement outlining the transition of power from the CPA to the Iraqi people.21 The
Governing Council, the initial group of Iraqi citizens that worked with the CPA, would be
replaced by a Transitional Assembly in accordance with the TAL, which was to be
written prior to the transfer of sovereignty from the occupying forces to the Iraqi
people.22
The TAL was drafted and promulgated on March 8, 2004. It also specifies that
the coalition government would dissolve upon the assumption of the new Iraqi
transitional government.23
On June 28, 2004 the U.S. formally transferred political authority to a transitional
government. “You are ready now for sovereignty and we think it’s an important part of
our obligation as temporary custodian to return the sovereignty to you,” U.S.
administrator L. Paul Bremer said. “I have confidence that the Iraqi government is ready
19

Susan Sachs, K. S. (2003, Dec. 14, 2004). Ex-Leader, Found Hiding in Hole, Is Detained Without a
Fight. New York Times. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 70].

20

The Old Statute. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13].

21

Agreement on Political Process, supra note 7. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

22

Id.

23

Id. “Article 29. Upon the assumption of full authority by the Iraqi Interim Government in accordance
with Article 2(B)(1), above, the Coalition Provisional Authority shall be dissolved and the work of the
Governing Council shall come to an end.”
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to meet the challenges that lie ahead.”24 U.S. relations were re-established with the arrival
of newly minted ambassador John Negroponte.25
Iraqi Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi noted that the interim government should
focus on the day-to-day administration of the country, the preparation of elections for the
Transitional National Assembly, provide for the safety and security of the Iraqi people
and to continue economic reconstruction and development.26 This is a reflection of Iraq’s
desire to limit the occupying forces’ authorities of this transitional government; let an
elected Iraqi government decide those issues. Those limits were to be decided through a
consultative process with Ambassador Brahimi.27 The U.N. meanwhile also recognized
the need for the Iraqi people to determine their own future in Security Council Resolution
1546.28
On January 30, 2005, Iraqis cast ballots in their first free elections in more than 50
years.29 The voters were to elect a 275-member national assembly charged with the task
of writing the country’s permanent constitution.30

24

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, D. S., Mike Allen. (2004, June 28, 2004). U.S. Transfers Political Authority in
Iraq. Washington Post. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 57].

25

Id. The U.S. had severed diplomatic ties with Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

26

Marc Grossman, The Imminent Transfer of Sovereignty in Iraq, House International Relations Comm.
Washington, DC (May 13, 2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 64].

27

Id.

28

U.N. SC Resolution 1546 (2004) at ¶¶ 1, 3, (“endorses the formation of a sovereign Interim Government
of Iraq … Reaffirms the right of the Iraq people freely to determine their own political future.”).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35].

29

Dexter Filkins. Iraqis Vote Amid Tight Security and Scattered Attacks. N.Y. TIMES. (January 30, 2005).
Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 62].
30

Id., See also TAL, supra at note 3, Arts. 60, 61. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
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B. Government transition
1. UNSC’s resolutions recognize coalition government31
The series of U.N. Security Council resolutions defines the history of the
occupation in Iraq. The U.S. and the U.K. proposed UNSC Resolution 1441 in 2002,
calling for Iraqi cooperation in the face of what it called lack of cooperation regarding
weapons disarmament.32 After the coalition forces attacked, the U.N. recognized the
coalition forces as in control of Iraq and lifted its sanctions against Iraq in UNSC
Resolution 1483, passed on May 22, 2003.33 Additionally, the UNSC has recognized the
legitimacy of the government.34
A humanitarian mission to Iraq (UNAMI) was subsequently created in August of
2003 with UNSC Resolution 150035 and renewed yearly after that, with the most recent
resolution extending the mission out to August 2006.36
UNSC Resolution 1546 was passed in June 2004. It endorsed the interim
government and noted that it would, “assume full responsibility and authority by 30 June
2004 for governing Iraq while refraining from taking any actions affecting Iraq’s destiny

31

See Chart 2 infra for a complete summary of the resolutions discussed in this section.

32

U.N. SC Resolution 1441 (2002). States that Iraq, “has been and remains in material breach of its
obligations” for weapons inspections. Demands that “Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and
actively with UNMOVIC and IAEA.”. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
33

U.N. SC Resolution 1483 (2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

34

Conor McCarthy, The Paradox of the International Law of Military Occupation: Sovereignty and the
Reformation of Iraq, 10 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 43, 66. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 49].

35

U.N. SC Resolution 1500 (2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 33].

36

See U.N. SC Resolution 1557 (2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36]; See also
U.N. SC Resolution 1619 (2005). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37].
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beyond the limited interim period until an elected Transitional Government of Iraq
assumes office . . . .”37
2. U.S. assistance
Within the scope of discussion for this memorandum, the U.S. interceded in Iraq’s
transition in three ways: the creation of the government and its laws, the creation of the
tribunal and the capturing of war criminals.
The occupying forces issued its first decree in the form of Regulation No. 1.38
This regulation gave the U.S. and its allies sweeping power to reform the country in all
aspects from governmental to legal to social institutions. This social engineering project
involved efforts in several different areas including De-Baathification, reform of security
and military institutions, human rights, criminal law and law enforcement, domestic and
foreign economic changes, and governmental culture reforms.39
The CPA promulgated Order No. 48, which gave authority to the Governing
Council to establish the Iraqi Special Tribunal (the “IST”).40 The order had an Appendix
A, which was offered as a set of “proposed provisions of which have been discussed

37

U.N. SC Resolution 1546, supra note 37. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35].

38

Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 1, CPA/REG/16 May 2003/01 (May 16, 2003), available
at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1_The_Coalition_Provisional_
Authority_.pdf. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6]. Prof. Fox notes that, “the
chronology at this point is rather unclear. CPA Regulation No. 1 bears a date of May 16, 2003, but it makes
reference to Security Council Resolution 1483, which was passed almost one week later on May 22, 2003.”
He suggests the regulation was back-dated. Fox, supra note 6, note 28. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 45].

39

See Fox, supra note 6, 208-225. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45].

40

Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 48, CPA/ORD/10 Dec. 2003/48 (Dec. 10, 2003), available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031210_CPAORD_48_IST_and_Appendix_A.pdf.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
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extensively between the Governing Council and the CPA . . . .”41 This appendix was
adopted completely without any change and became the Old Statute. The TAL confirmed
the Old Statute in Art. 48:
(A)The statute establishing the Iraqi Special Tribunal
issued on 10 December 2003 is confirmed. That statute
exclusively defines its jurisdiction and procedures,
notwithstanding the provisions of this Law.
(B) No other court shall have jurisdiction to examine cases
within the competence of the Iraqi Special Tribunal,
except to the extent provided by its founding statute.42
On August 11, 2005 the Transitional Assembly passed a public act that repealed
the Old Statute and promulgated the New Statute.43 At this point, there appears to have
been U.S. involvement in the process was minimal.44
3. Towards full sovereignty: Direct elections and constitutional
referendum
On January 30, 2005, Iraq held its first elections in more 50 years. American and
Iraqi troops provided security for the elections and also patrolled the streets on election
day.45
The job of the newly elected Transitional National Assembly was to create a new
constitution and to offer it up to be adopted by the general citizenry of Iraq. On October

41

Id at §1 ¶1.

42

See TAL, supra at note 3. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11].

43

New Statute, supra at note 5. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10].

44

Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq Special Tribunal, 38 Cornell Int'l
L.J. 327, 327 (2005). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41].

45

Filkins, supra note 29.[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 62].
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15, 2005, the Iraqis went to the polls again and ratified the new constitution.46 The new
constitution addressed many of the conflicts between the Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, in an
attempt to give a new governmental framework for law and order to prevail over the
conflicts of a nascent government.47
III.

LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. The law of government succession and the legitimacy and justice of the
IST
The legal discussion begins by examining the existing law pertaining to

governmental successions in military occupation situations. Specifically, the focus of this
section is to determine whether the IST is a legitimate form of justice to adjudicate the
matters before it. Initially, a background of occupying powers law is given, which
includes the laws relevant to transitional justice. Various recognized general problems
with transitional justice are then articulated.
1. Background of occupying powers law48
a. Origins of the law
The origins of occupying power law developed as a necessary reaction to the laws
of war.49 This reflected the terminology of belligerent occupation. But there is an

46

BBC News, Iraq voters back new constitution. (Oct. 25, 2005). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 56].

47

Iraq’s Draft Constitution, translated by the U.N. Office for Constitutional Support and edited by the New
York Times. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9].

48

See generally EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (1993). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 20]; See also Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L.
195, 202 (Winter 2005) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45].
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increasing number of situations of non-war occupations that may result from armistice
agreements, conflicts in other territories or just cession of powers.50 In addition to this,
may be the public relations aspect of not wanting to acknowledge an armed conflict.51
Because of this shifting and ambiguous situation, there was a movement in the
international community to try to better define occupation law by clarifying the situations
it arises under and also the substantive law of what may or may not be done by the
occupying forces.
Two instruments in particular have become accepted as the customary
international law of occupying powers law, which are binding on any state, regardless of
whether or not they have accepted it. 52 These instruments are the 1907 Hague Relations
on Land Warfare53 and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.54
Both of these instruments include notions of just treatment for the citizenry and
more importantly for purposes of this memorandum, they discuss the parameters of the
law during an occupation. Articles 42 and 43 of the Hague Conventions state that:
Art. 42. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually
placed under the authority of the hostile army. The
occupation applies only to the territory where such
authority is established, and in a position to assert itself.

49

EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 3 (1993). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 20].

50

Id.

51

Id. at 4.

52

Fox supra note 6, 230. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 42].

53

Hague Regulations, supra note 4. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

54

Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
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Art. 43. The authority of the legitimate power having
actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter
shall take all steps in his power to re-establish and
insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
force in the country.55
Article 64 of Geneva Convention IV then provides that:
Art. 64. The penal laws of the occupied territory shall
remain in force, with the exception that they may be
repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases
where they constitute a threat to its security or an
obstacle to the application of the present Convention.
Subject to the latter consideration and to the necessity
for ensuring the effective administration of justice, the
tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to
function in respect of all offences covered by the said
laws.
The Occupying Power may, however, subject the
population of the occupied territory to provisions which
are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its
obligations under the present Convention, to maintain
the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure
the security of the Occupying Power, of the members
and property of the occupying forces or administration,
and likewise of the establishments and lines of
communication used by them.56
The U.S. has incorporated this article wholesale in Section 360 of its Army Field
Manual. Therefore, there is explicit acceptance of this convention in the practices of
warfare for the U.S.57 Noted in ¶ 3, there are exceptions in which the occupying force
may pass laws. These are extremely limited, and the Commentaries call the list

55

Hague Regulations, supra note 4. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

56

Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5, Art. 64. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8].

57

Army Field Manual. 27-10, Ch. 6 Occupation. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 72].
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“limitative,” suggesting there are no additional exceptions to derogate from the article.58
Because the occupying forces did not meet any of these listed exceptions, it was not able
to create the IST on its own initiative; that is why the Interim Governing Council
officially promulgated the Old Statute.59
b. Statehood and the conservationist principle
There is a question of when Iraq became a new state subject to international laws.
Scholars have discussed this question of statehood and there are two views on recognition
and the real politique of statehood.60 One camp says that in order for a state to exist, it
must be recognized as a state by others; all other entities, even if they may be called a
“state” do not have any legal status, so international law may not be applied to them.61
The other view is that a state may exist without being recognized formally by other states,
and that international law applies such an entity regardless of whether it has been
recognized or not.62
In Iraq’s situation, there was immediate recognition of the U.S. as the occupying
and legitimate authority in Iraq after the war. U.N. Security Resolution 1483 called the
coalition forces “occupying powers” and recognized the corresponding “specific

58

JEAN S. PICTET, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARIES, Art. 64. [Relevant
portion reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27].

59

See CPA Order No. 48, supra note 40. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4].

60

See SHELDON M. COHEN, ARMS AND JUDGMENT: LAW AND MORALITY AND THE CONDUCT OF WAR IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. 1989. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23].

61

62

Id. at 15-16.
Id.
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authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law,” that
came with that status.63
If the coalition troops are to be regarded as an occupying force, then they must
take on a temporary custodial role in the territory they control. This means that they only
exercise de facto power and have no legitimate general legislative authority to make laws,
or promulgate any permanent changes to various instruments of the country.64 This is
called the “conservationist principle.”
Thus, ostensibly the status quo laws and governmental structures were in
existence for the short time period after the invasion and the promulgation of the first
order noting any change to the existing laws of Iraq. The first such order was in Order
No. 7, making some changes to the Iraqi Penal Code.65
It is therefore arguable that Iraq never lost its statehood. A completely new state
will exist once it has adopted a new constitution, elected its own Assembly and displayed
all the other normative elements that states have.66 This had not occurred completely
when the Transitional Assembly amended the Old Statute into the New Statute. So, there
was a period of transitional government in question, which is examined next.

63

U.N. SC Resolution 1483 (2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32]; See also
McCarthy, supra note 34, 45, (asserting that the coalition forces are in fact occupiers.) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 49].

64

Fox supra note 6, 199. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 45].

65

Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 7, CPA/ORD/9 June 2003/07 (Dec. 10, 2003), available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030610_CPAORD_7_Penal_Code.pdf . [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

66

See Cohen, supra note 60, 15. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23]. “[R]easonable
probability of permanence, the essential characteristics of a state, namely an organized government, a
defined territory, and such a degree of independence of control by any other state as to be capable of
conducting its own international relations.”
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c. Law’s impact on transitional governments
In transitional administrations, there is a tension between restoration of justice and
security in post-conflict situations.67 This is representative of trying to have life in the
country restored to law and order, but to still have the safety, to have a shield against the
aftershocks of the previous conflict. The lower, more basic need of security and peace
trumps the need for justice.68 This is reflected by many scholar’s belief that the primary
purpose of international law is to preserve security and peace; the U.N. Charter’s
Preamble69 for instance does not mention justice at all, but instead makes clear that the
need to protect security and peace is paramount.70
When an occupying force is involved, unique features of exercising law over
foreign people must be considered. They include (1) consideration of the multiplicity of
actors (from the military to police force to other peace-keepers),71 and (2) consideration
of ambiguities in the law.72 The many different peoples involved with creating the
tribunal represent an example of the first consideration – the court officials, the decisions
of the nationalities of whom to hire for judges, prosecutors and investigators.73
67

Carsten Stahn, Justice Under Transitional Administration: Contours and Critique of a Paradigm, 27
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 311, 315.; [Reproduced in accompany notebook at Tab 52]; See also T. Grant, Iraq: How
to reconcile conflicting obligations of occupation and reform. ASIL Insights (2003).[Reproduced in
accompany notebook at Tab 63].
68

YEHUDA MELZER, CONCEPTS OF JUST WAR 39, 45-46 (1975). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 26].
69

U.N. Charter (1945). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 38].

70

Melzer, supra note 68, 39-40. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].

71

Stahn, supra note 67, at 316. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 52]

72

Id. at 318.

73

See later discussion regarding the nationalities of these actors, infra III.E.2.
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With regard to the second feature, the post-conflict situation often is one
hampered by a lack of judicial resources and a question of what applicable laws may be
used; a report from the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations has suggested a uniform criminal
code in such emergency situations.74 Another source of ambiguity is the linguistic
difficulties of translating between different languages. The Old Statute was promulgated
in both English and Arabic, but it seems that the statute was written in English at first and
the Arabic translation is poor;75 additionally, the CPA Regulation 1 states that English is
the controlling language.76 Admittedly, the order refers only to CPA Regulations and
Orders, which the Statute is not, but the Statute was adopted wholesale from the CPA
Order, which yields some confusion. Furthermore, Art. 32 of the Old Statute (which is
Art 35 of the New Statute) declares that Arabic is the official language for the Tribunal.
These factors manifest themselves if tribunals are created in post-conflict
situations to address any crimes members of the previous government may have
committed during their reign. Some of these problems involve a lack of resources for the
occupying powers.77 Tribunals are also politicized affairs and may end up becoming

74

Stahn, supra note 67, 318. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 52]

75

Bassiouni, supra note 44, 366. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 41].

76

CPA Regulation No. 1, supra note 38, §3(2). “The Regulation or Order shall enter into force as specified
therein, shall be promulgated in the relevant languages and shall be disseminated as widely as possible. In
the case of divergence, the English text shall prevail.” . [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
6].

77

Charles Call, Is Transitional Justice Really Just?, XI BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 101, 102. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 42].
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media battles.78 And finally, it may just be a version of victor’s justice, with a kangaroo
court.79
Thus, the inherent nature of post-conflict situations poses a problem for the
creation and maintenance of the tribunals. In the case of the IST, these factors and
manifestations have been pointed out by various critics of the IST.

80

This affects the

perceived legitimacy of the IST, which the next subsection discusses.
2. Is the IST a legitimate court to provide justice?
Various organizations and entities have challenged the IST on the basis of
questioning the legitimacy of the transitional administration and its inherent ability or
lack thereof to provide justice to the Iraqis. Amnesty International for instance challenged
the Old Statute on several areas from the basis of its independence and impartiality of
judges and prosecutors to what it perceived as inadequate guarantees for a fair trial. 81
Other challenges are based on the lawfulness of the origins that establish the
tribunal itself. This question also arose before the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”). In fact, defendant Dusko Tadic argued against the
legitimacy of the ICTY in one of its cases.82 The Trial Chamber opined it had no
authority to investigate its own legality, but the Appeals Chamber concluded that it had
78

Id. at 105.

79

Id. at 109.

80

See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL – FAIR TRIALS NOT GUARANTEED
(2005). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 54].

81

Id.

82

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.: IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Aug. 10, 1995.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
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an inherent power to review the authority of the Security Council, its progenitor, in order
to determine the legality of establishing the tribunal.83
In its decision, the appeals chamber responded to Tadic’s argument that the ICTY
was not established by law, as required by Article 14 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),84 saying this argument was erroneous.85 The court
said that the proper interpretation of that provision of the ICCPR was that “established by
law” meant that the tribunal should be “established in accordance with the proper
international standards; it must provide all the guarantees of fairness, justice and
evenhandedness, in full conformity with internationally recognized human rights
instruments.”86
Another reason why the IST is a legitimate court is its independence from the rest
of the Iraqi judicial system. The Iraqi Federal Court system does not hear appeals from
the IST, for instance.87 This is because of a recognition that a separation and
independence of both court systems is necessary to gain legitimacy.88
83

See Ahran Kang, The Key Lessons from the Iraqi Special Tribunal Can Learn from the ICTY, ICTR, and
SCSL, Memorandum for the IST, Nov. 2004. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 67].

84

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force March 23,
1976, G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), U.N..Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171. Art. 14, ¶ 1 states, “In the
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established
by law." (ICCPR, art. 14, para. 1.) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28].

85

Kang, supra note 83, 4. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 67].

86

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.: IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, Oct 2, 1995. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].

87

See Pratheep Sevanthinathan, Can the Iraqi Federal Judiciary hear Issues on Appeal, That First Arise in
an Iraqi Special Tribunal Proceeding? AND Is the Denial of the Right to Appeal to a Nation’s Highest
Federal Court a Violation of Human Rights Norms?, Memorandum for the IST, Apr. 2005. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 71].

88

Id. at 23.

James Tsai

Page 20 of 42

Fall 2005 – IST Question 1

The IST is a lawful court, but arguably, the real politique situation is that it is not
necessarily a legitimate one; respect and legitimacy must be earned from the international
community.89
B. Was the change from the Old Statute to the New Statute an amendment,
or a replacement?
Using the compare document function of Microsoft Word between the two
versions of the Statute, the following major changes were noted:90
•

The tribunal was renamed to the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court.91

•

Article 1(2) of the New Statute: Expanded the jurisdiction of the court from
exclusively crimes against peoples of Iraq to crimes against humanity.

•

Article 7(2) of the New Statute (Article 7(b) of the Old Statute): Instead of
requiring non-Iraqis to serve in the IST, there is a looser statement that they may
serve with the IST.

•

Article 8(2) of the New Statute: The number of investigative judges was changed
from 20 to a “sufficient number.”

•

Article 9 of the New Statute: The prosecutors were changed in numbers similarly
to the investigative judges and also the requirements and disqualifying factors
were changed to make it easier to qualify.

•

Article 16 of the New Statute: A set of Rules of Procedure and Evidence were
adopted.

•

Article 19(4)(B) and (C) of the New Statute: For the rights of the accused, added
the right to have non-Iraqi legal representation, as long as the principal lawyer is
Iraqi and there is no undue delay in the prosecution.

89

See Ilias Bantekas, The Iraqi Special Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanity, 54 ICLQ 237, 252 (2005).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40].

90

Comparison of the Old and New Iraqi Special Tribunal Statutes. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 59].

91

Though the IST has been renamed to the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court (hereinafter the IHCC), we use IST
interchangeably with IHCC as the media, officials and other documents continue to refer to it as the IST.
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Ultimately, very little of substance was changed. The list of defined war crimes
for instance remains the same, arguably the most substantive portion of the statute.92
Based on the minimal nature of these changes, therefore it can be argued that the statute
was only amended and not replaced.
C. Is the Assembly permitted to amend the Statute?
An amendment is, “a legal invention not derivable from the existing body of
accepted legal materials.”93 This is contrasted with an interpretation, which twists the
existing words on the page for a new effective application.94
Art. 48(a) of the TAL states that the Statute issued on Dec. 10, 2003 “exclusively
defines the [Tribunal’s] jurisdiction and procedures, notwithstanding the provisions of the
[TAL.]”95 Critics of the amendment to the Statute point to this Article, saying that any
change to the Statute is in violation of this article. But, the TAL is not a perfect
document. Art 15(I) states that, “special or exceptional courts may not be established.”
Regardless, a constitution has primacy over all other forms of legislation, and the
Statute does originate in terms of its legitimacy from the TAL.96 Therefore, it is possible
to say that the amendment procedures of the TAL should be considered. Originally, there

92

Comparison of the Old and New Iraqi Special Tribunal Statutes, supra note 90, Arts. 12-15. .
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 59].

93

SANFORD LEVINSON. RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION : THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 16 (1995). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25].

94

95

Id.
TAL, supra note 2, at Art. 48(a). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11].

96

Bantekas, supra note 40, 239-240. The entire efficacy of the TAL itself would be in question, according
to Bantekas, if the Statute is not deemed to originate from the TAL and instead from some other entity such
as the CPA. . [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 40].
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were provisions to prevent any sort of amending of the TAL from taking place. The Nov.
15, 2003 transitional agreement states that the “Fundamental Law,” which would later be
known as the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period
(TAL), could not be amended.97 But, the finalized TAL provides that it may be amended
in Art. 3.98 Though these are provisions for amending the TAL itself, it suggests that
amending any other legislation would be permitted.
D. Alternatively, considering that the changes were a replacement, what are
the consequences?
If the changes are considered a replacement, which is a possible interpretation of
the amendment, we must consider if the Assembly has the authority to do so. To consider
this, we must first take into account the Assembly’s sources of legitimacy and authority
and determine whether or not it is in fact a legitimate body. From this, we can then
determine whether or not it was authorized to replace the Statute.

97

Agreement on Political Process, supra note 21. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

98

Article 3. (A)This Law is the Supreme Law of the land and shall be binding in all parts of Iraq without
exception. No amendment to this Law may be made except by a three-fourths majority of the
members of the National Assembly and the unanimous approval of the Presidency Council.
Likewise, no amendment may be made that could abridge in any way the rights of the Iraqi people
cited in Chapter Two; extend the transitional period beyond the timeframe cited in this Law; delay
the holding of elections to a new assembly; reduce the powers of the regions or governorates; or
affect Islam, or any other religions or sects and their rites.
(B) Any legal provision that conflicts with this Law is null and void.
(C)This Law shall cease to have effect upon the formation of an elected government pursuant to a
permanent constitution.
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1. What source of legitimacy does the Assembly have?
a. International recognition of legitimacy
The U.N. has recognized the legitimacy of the Iraqi government, and the U.S. as
occupying force.99 After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraq opened up its
diplomatic missions around the world; this was a key priority of the Interim
Government’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.100 By being recognized by the U.N. and
attempting to re-establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries, the country of Iraq
approaches recognition as legitimate.
b. Democratically elected Assembly by the people
Professor Buchanan notes that democracy is a necessary condition for legitimacy
of a political entity.101 This notion is based on two premises: (1) democracy can do at
least as well as alternative systems that can create legal systems that protect the citizens’
basic interests and (2) participating as an equal in the political process to choose the
political leaders that wield power is an important dimension of the culture of the state.102
These premises provide a backdrop to assess democracy as a source of legitimacy for the
Assembly.

99

U.N. SC Resolution 1546 (2004) at ¶ 2. (calling the situation in Iraq an “occupation”). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 35].

100

CPA, AN HISTORIC REVIEW OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS 2003-2004 49 (2004). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 60].

101

ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW 251 (2003). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

102

Id.
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Since the Assembly was elected democratically by the people in its first elections
in over 50 years, the people reflected the egalitarian principle that they were now able to
choose their leaders in a fashion that they had not been able to do for a long time.
Additionally, the U.N. saw the importance of democracy in the formulation of its
policies involving Iraq. After the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the U.N. articulated
an overarching principle for itself with regard to its policy of assistance and work with
the country. It would rely on as limited an international presence as possible, and as many
Afghan nationals for its staff as possible. This principle become known as the “light
footprint” approach.103 The U.N. found that this principle was even more critical in the
case of Iraq, because of the need for the Iraqi’s to become masters of their own country’s
future.104
2. Is the Assembly a legitimate body of government?
Professor Buchanan defines an entity as having “political legitimacy . . . if and
only if it is morally justified in exercising political power. The exercise of political power
may be defined as the (credible) attempt to achieve supremacy in the making, application,
and enforcement of laws within a jurisdiction.”105 He goes on to argue that the political
entity must exercise minimal standards of protection of human rights.106
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Simon Chesterman, Walking Softly in Afghanistan: the Future of U.N. State Building, 44 SURVIVAL 37,
37 (2002). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 42].

104

Press Release, “’Blue Flag’ Flying in Iraq, But Light Footprint Unavoidable in Current Security
Situation, Security Council Told,” U.N. Doc. SC/8186 (Sept. 14, 2004). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 30].
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Id. at 233.

106

Id. at 234.

James Tsai

Page 25 of 42

Fall 2005 – IST Question 1

Using this definition, we can examine the TAL’s language to determine whether
its limitations and goals fulfill the human rights-attention requirement. In the preamble,
this notion is apparent: “These people affirming today their respect for international law,
especially having been amongst the founders of the United Nations, working to …
establish the mechanisms aiming, amongst other aims, to erase the effects of racist and
sectarian policies and practices.”107
In practice, this is admittedly questionable. Government agents were accused for
instance, recently for taking part in the killings of one of Saddam Hussein’s fellow
accused’s defense lawyers.108 The media attention given to this event has caused the Iraqi
public to question the legitimacy of its government.
Arguably, CPA did not officially abrogate from the 1990 Iraqi Constitution; there
was no explicit treaty or legal instrument that recognized the end of that Constitution.
The occupying forces, in recognition of the Hague Conventions, had came into power as
custodians of Iraq and technically, the 1990 Iraqi Constitution was still in force as they
created the provision government.109 Therefore, in the most academic sense, the reigning
constitution in Iraq at the time of the amending of the Statute was the 1990 Iraqi
Constitution, as amended in 1995.110
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TAL, supra note 2, Preamble. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11]. Cf., Agreement
on Political Process, supra note 1, §1, The Fundamental Law. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 1].
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Another Saddam Co-Defendant’s Lawyer Slain, The Washington Post, Nov. 8, 2005. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 55].
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McCarthy, supra note 34, 72. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 49].
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One criticism of the occupying forces is that they were in violation of the Geneva
Convention for promulgating laws even though they never formally abrogated the
Constitution with its Regulations and Orders. It is possible to compare this situation with
Israel’s construction of a wall in occupied Palestinian Territory. The ICJ ruled that the
wall violated international human rights law in an advisory opinion last year.111 One line
of reasoning from the court, was that there was a de facto violation of Geneva
Convention Art. 49(6), which prohibits an occupying power from transporting any of its
own population into those occupied territories via the construction of the wall.112
Analogizing to the occupying forces in Iraq, the Regulations and Orders promulgated,
including the Old Statute, which was taken completely wholesale, was a de facto change
of the existing laws of Iraq, which is a violation of the Geneva Conventions.
That situation changed when those laws were no longer the de facto law of the
land, because entire portions of that constitution were abrogated implicitly with the
adoption of new governmental structures and TAL Art. 3 states that it is the supreme law
of the land.113
Furthermore, the CPA provided for its own dissolution in Order No. 100.114 All
“powers, authorities and responsibilities” for both the CPA and the Administrator were

111

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion (Int'l Ct. Justice July 9, 2004), 4. 3 ILM 1009 (2004) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 14].
112

David Kretzmer., Agora: ICJ Advisory opinion on construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian
territory: the advisory opinion: the light treatment of international humanitarian law, 99 AJIL 88, 93
(2005). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48].
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transferred to the Interim Government.115 Because the CPA was recognized as the
legitimate occupying force beforehand, the new Transitional government, which the
Asssembly is a part of, should be recognized as legitimate.
3. Is the Assembly authorized constitutionally to make changes to the
Statute?
Based on the discussion earlier in this section, the Assembly is constitutionally
permitted to replace the Statute. Additionally, the power to replace the statute implies that
there is an ability to amend it, supporting the discussion supra.
a. Minor changes to the statute
The first reason is because the changes to the Statute are minor, as discussed
above. This is an argument taking into consideration the de minimis effect on the IST.
Though it is possible to suggest that there are significant concerns for some stakeholders
in these changes, they overall are not significant enough to have derailed the ongoing
process that is taking place. If anything, the changes have merely served as an update and
refinement to respond to the practical situation facing the IST. For instance, the changes
in judge and prosecutor selection have been loosened, in response to the difficulty finding
qualified candidates.
b. Sources of Assembly’s power are legitimate
Another reason is to consider the sources of legitimacy of the Assembly. They are
rooted as mentioned above, in the international recognition of the legitimacy of the entity
and the democratically elected nature of its selection. Consequently, because of these

115

Id. at §2(1), (2).

James Tsai

Page 28 of 42

Fall 2005 – IST Question 1

sources, the Assembly is legitimate. On moral justification grounds, the TAL has
specified a respect for human rights; this is another important factor to gain legitimacy
for the Assembly.
What remains then, is to show that the right to self-determination, in the form of
amendment is an inherent right for the legitimate body of the Assembly, specifically with
regard to the change in the Statute. In the United States, Constitutional Convention
delegate and one of the first members of the Supreme Court, James Wilson wrote,
“[P]eople may change the constitutions whenever and however they please. This is a right
of which no positive institution may deprive them.”116
This notion is of course, predicated on a political process that allows all citizens
to take part in governance. Because the elections were free and open to everyone,
yielding a legitimate Assembly, their actions are legitimate.117
Critics point to the occupying forces’ explicit delegation of authority to create the
IST. They claim this is a violation of international humanitarian law and thus not
legitimate; only by reconstituting the Tribunal they argue, will it gain legitimacy.118 The
Assembly has done exactly that, and made minor changes to make it more like a domestic
court.
116

Levinson, supra note 93, 98. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
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In the U.S., this notion of political process is an important one. It protects minorities rights. See
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 19].; See also U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), note 4 (“whether prejudice
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17].
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Marco Sassoli, Legislations and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life By Occupying Powers, 16
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c. Explicit language of TAL is overridden by implicit rights of
Assembly
Next, we turn to the explicit language of the TAL. As discussed earlier, Art. 48(a)
of the TAL states that the Statute issued on Dec. 10, 2003 “exclusively defines the
[Tribunal’s] jurisdiction and procedures, notwithstanding the provisions of the [TAL.]”119
So, the legal question is, is there a legal effect from this language that precludes any
changes to the TAL? The obvious answer, as discussed earlier with respect to
amendments,

120

is that the Statute is derived from the TAL, and not meant to be a

separate legal entity by itself; the same arguments about the amendments are applicable
here for the replacement.
It is also of arguable that this is a mere procedural matter; the Assembly may
simply amend the TAL, since none of the restrictions under Art. 3 that do not allow
amendments to the TAL are encountered. The changes made to the Old Statute are akin
to an administrative step that is needed to achieve something. The legitimate Assembly
considered the Statute in the light of the post-occupation government and decided to
abrogate it and propose a Statute that was substantially the same as the old one; there is
no real amending here, let alone unconstitutional modifications going on. This is just a
refining administratively of the IST to achieve its mission of providing justice.
d. Due process concerns
With regard to due process concerns, the various stakeholders involved with the
business of the IST are not affected.
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TAL, supra note 2, at Art. 48(a). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
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In the time between the Old Statute’s promulgation and the change with the New
Statute (a period of 20 months), there have been a good number of accused that have
entered the docket of the IST. The first group of accused did not formally become
involved with the IST until June 29, 2004, which involved the transfer of a dozen of highlevel officials of Saddam’s regime from the custody of the U.S. forces.121 This still leaves
a period of 13 months under the those in Old Statute. But again, the nature of changes is
de minimis. The crimes that are mentioned in the New Statute are identical to the Old
Statute, and a broadening of selection criteria for prosecutors and judges doesn’t affect
the accused in a negative manner. If anything, it may aid them.
Considering all these arguments, the Assembly had the constitutional powers to
make the change to the Statute.
E. Does the newly elected Assembly lend credibility and legitimacy to the
Tribunal?
1. Legitimacy
The Assembly itself is a legitimate political entity.122 Arguably, the act of
changing the Statute for the Tribunal lent the Assembly’s legitimacy to it also.123
Additionally, because the people have access and a voice in the political process, there
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Press Release, Agreement with MNF to assume control of individuals in custody, IST, June 28, 2004,
available at http://www.iraq-ist.org/en/press/releases/0007e.htm . Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 68]. ;Press Release, Arrest warrants handed down, IST, June 29, 2004, available at
http://www.iraq-ist.org/en/press/releases/0008e.htm .[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
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See supra III.D.
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Bassiouni, supra note 44, 387-8. Prof. Bassiouni recommended in this article the repromulgation of the
Statute. His article was presumably written before the repromulgation in August. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 41].
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was a democratic dimension in the decisions of the Assembly124; the people in a sense
have given their approval for the changes and operation of the Tribunal.
Also, principles of comity dictate that other nations should recognize the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation within its territory.125 Because the
Assembly has been recognized as the legitimate legislative branch of the Iraqi
Transitional government, it deserves respect via comity from other nations.
2. Credibility
That leads the discussion to the more difficult question of credibility. One
criticism of the IST has centered around the initial U.S. involvement. The Statute was
promulgated wholesale from the CPA’s Order No. 48.126 The U.S. Congress appropriated
U.S.$75 million to pay for investigations and prosecutions of former government officials
in Iraq.127 This amount was subsequently expanded to U.S.$128 million.128 This heavy
dependence on the U.S. undermines its credibility. How could a supposedly impartial
tribunal be successful in apportioning justice, if it is viewed simply as victor’s justice?129
124

See supra III.D.3.b for this discussion.
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48 C.J.S. International Law § 9 (2005). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
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CPA, Order No. 48. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
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Human Rights Watch, The Former Iraqi Government on Trial (Oct. 16, 2005) 17, available at
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Compare this situation to the International Criminal Court’s struggle for legitimacy. One scholar, talking
about the importance of international organs, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian wall says that
skepticism is mainly grounded in the fear that the ICC's decisions will be dictated by politics rather than by
law. In this atmosphere the credibility of international judicial organs involved in assessing compliance
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The answer lies in the actions of the Assembly. By abrogating in effect the Old
Statute and replacing it with their own, they have tried to make the IST appear more like
an Iraqi-owned process. The few changes in the statute serve this purpose. For instance,
in the Old Statute, Art. 6(b) states that “[t]he President of the Tribunal shall be required to
appoint non-Iraqi nationals to act in advisory capacities or as observers to the Trial
Chambers and to the Appeals Chamber.”
In the New Statute, Art. 7(b), which is the corresponding article defining the
responsibilities of the IST’s President, states that “[t]he President of the Court shall have
the right to appoint non-Iraqi experts to the Criminal Court and the Cassation
Commission. The role of the non-Iraqi nationals shall be to provide assistance with
respect to international law and the experience of similar Courts (whether international or
otherwise).”130
Another example of a change is the use of the death penalty. Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International have both protested the allowance of the death
penalty,131 which is peculiar to the IST and different from the other ad hoc tribunals, that
all forbid the death penalty. The Iraqi’s have insisted on pursuing the death penalty,
which is part of their culture, over the objections of the occupying forces’ suggestions.132

112, 102. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48].
130

Comparison of Old and New Iraqi Special Tribunal Statutes. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 59].

131
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Debate between Dr. Curtis Doebbler and Prof. Michael Scharf, “Will Saddam Hussein Get a Fair Trial?”
37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 21 (2005). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 44].

James Tsai

Page 33 of 42

Fall 2005 – IST Question 1

Finally, perhaps the most innocuous, but certainly a most symbolic change in the
Statute is the name. The original name of the Statute called it something that the English
translation notes as “special.” Scholars have noted that the term “special” has a negative
connotation in the Iraqi historical context; Saddam’s perverted courts that killed many
people in farcical shows of justice were known as “special” courts. 133 When the New
Statute was promulgated, a new name was used. It was now called the Higher Iraqi
Criminal Court.134 This is symbolic of the Iraqis taking control of their Tribunal.
Amnesty International states that there are three pillars to fight against the
possible impunity of the criminals under Saddam’s regime. They are justice, truth and
reparations, all necessary for lasting peace and reconciliation in Iraq.135 These are basic,
assumed elements of any court. If the IST is representative of these ideals, it will gain
credibility. If it does not, the IST may face the situation that the ICTY faced when there
questions of impartiality of that tribunal by the citizenry. A public opinion poll asked
whether or not Milosevic was getting a fair trial; overwhelmingly, the public said he was
not.136
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David B. Hodgkinson, Preparations for a Precedent, Symposium Post-Conflict Justice: From Malmédy
to Halabja University of Idaho College of Law 2nd Annual International Law Symposium, 13 Mich. St. J.
Int'l L 79, 83 (2005). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 47].
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Consequently, the IST will gain credibility because of the Assembly’s attempts to
give the Tribunal more of a domestic nature and tone. Also, the legitimacy of the
Assembly is imputed onto the Tribunal.
F. What possible problems may arise if the Tribunal is found to be not
legitimate?
An illegitimate court obviously will not serve the goals of the court. The three
pillars discussed above would not be achieved: justice, truth and reparations.137
1. Considering theories of punishment
Theories of punishment deal with society asking what to do with their criminals.
Court systems are recognized as the givers of punishment. If they are not perceived to be
legitimate, then it affects the legitimacy of the punishment, which is a form of two of the
pillars mentioned earlier – justice and reparations.
Philosophically, there are two main theories for why we punish: utilitarianism and
retributivism.138 Retributivism deals with an idea of just-desserts. People who commit
crimes should answer for their actions. This is a retrospective approach that considers the
past actions and seeks to justify the punishment solely on the crime that was
committed.139
Utilitarianism on the other hand seeks to please society as a whole. Legal
philosopher Jeremy Bentham writes that human beings are creatures of pain and pleasure.
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See discussion in previous section regarding Amnesty International’s three pillars.
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JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 4 (1st ed. 1987). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 24].
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Because of people’s natural inclination to avoid pain and wanting to maximize pleasure,
they normally will consider the potential punishment before to they commit a crime. In a
sense, this is a prospective approach; the punishment should be greater than what they
contemplated while meditating on the crime to deter them.140
If Saddam Hussein, the undeniable star defendant of the IST receives the death
penalty, this will satisfy the retributivist theory of punishment. He is getting his “justdesserts” so to speak for his past acts.141
But, considering a utilitarian point of view, if the tribunal is deemed to not be
legitimate, this punishment achieve the deterring and utilitarian result of telling the world
of how people who commit atrocities are dealt with. The result of retribution to Saddam’s
victims and their families is arguably achieved regardless of the legitimacy of the court,
but the rest of society and the world suffers in other ways, discussed in the next section.
2. Healing and truth finding
Among the various goals of the tribunal, scholars have included truth finding and
a creation of a historical record as important results for the Tribunal to achieve.142
First, with regards to truth-finding, the extensive reign of Saddam’s regime was
known for its secrecy and clandestine human rights abuses. It is unclear even today what
the exact acts were and the extent they took place. In order to heal and move on, a society
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See David Gersh, Poor Judgment: Why the Iraqi Special Tribunal is the Wrong Mechanism For Trying
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should be able to have a chance to proclaim in public their stories and their accounts; this
achieves a therapeutic result that allows the country to heal.
Since 1990, over two-dozen countries have created truth-commissions in postconflict situations.143 These commissions seek to create shared accounts, document who
committed atrocities and to start the road to reconciliation, all which the tribunals are
unable to do in the same way.144
Secondly, the historical record that is created from this truth-finding process
achieves a utilitarian result – the world has a chance to again be deterred from
committing such atrocities, but it also is a chapter in mankind’s history. This is necessary
in assessing, making and promulgating future policies about governmental structures and
war criminals such as Saddam.
3. The government and state’s legitimacy
If the Tribunal is found to not be legitimate, then it may affect the Assembly and
the new government of Iraq’s own legitimacy.
International attention on the Tribunal is part of this. The incorporation of
international law (the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention) into the Statute
represents the drafters’ intent to have international law be used in its proceedings. Even
after the repromulgation of the Statute, the revisers felt that it was important to leave the
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Call, supra note 77, 103. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 42].
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references in, out of deference to the international community, which now has an interest
on the affairs of Iraq and arguably the most important trial in its history.145
If the Tribunal does not do a credible job or is not perceived to be legitimate, then
the international community may impute that uncertainty onto the nascent government of
Iraq.
The notion of exhaustion of domestic remedies exists in many international
courts; this idea is that cases cannot be brought before the international court if the
domestic courts are able to handle the cases. The American Convention on Human
Rights146 has this idea in Art. 46(1):
a. that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued
and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized
principles of international law;
b. that the petition or communication is lodged within a
period of six months from the date on which the party
alleging violation of his rights was notified of the final
judgment;
c. that the subject of the petition or communication is not
pending in another international proceeding for
settlement
In the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,147 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
noted that the American Convention’s domestic remedies exhaustion remedy could be
circumvented if the remedies themselves were trivial or a “senseless formality.”148
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Certainly, the petitioner in that case was seeking redress for human rights abuses, but the
principle of allowing a national court to deal with atrocities that took place mostly in Iraq
with Iraqi victims is understandable and even appreciated.149
This idea also exists in the newly formed International Criminal Court (the
“ICC”) as the doctrine of complimentarity. In Article 17 of the Rome Statute,150 which
establishes the ICC, this doctrine is provided for:
"[T]he Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible
where: The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a
State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation
or prosecution; The case has been investigated by a State
which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not
to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State
genuinely to prosecute."
Similarly, if somehow the legitimacy of the IST is called into question and a
removal of the cases to the ICC takes place, it would be shameful upon Iraq; it would be
indicative of a stigmatizing effect on the state as a whole for its debilitations.
Consequently, the healing of Iraq and its attempts to regain any standing on the world
stage would also be impeded.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The scope of this memorandum concerns the revision of the Statute. Arguably, if

the problem with the Statute is the legitimacy due to procedural amendment problems,
the obvious solutions is to use the old Statute. But then using the old statute would yield
149
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the victor’s justice problem the CPA has pointed to: using a statute promulgated by the
occupying forces in the form of the CPA.
Using the New Statute exclusively encounters legitimacy problems also of course;
these deal with the transfer of power, the fairness and credibility of the Tribunal.
Therefore, it seems that either forms of the Statute may be questioned for its
legitimacy. This suggests that the question is simply subterfuge to get at the legitimacy of
the IST itself, questioning transitional and war crimes justice again. This memorandum
has dealt with these questions.
Overall, the Assembly was constitutionally empowered to make its changes to the
Old Statute. The Assembly is a legitimate organization that made de minimis
modifications to the Statute and re-promulgated it to take ownership of the judicial
process and give legitimacy and credibility to the IST. Furthermore, whether or not the
change to the statute was an amendment or a replacement, the results are the same –
namely, a legitimate Statute. Finally, so long as the Tribunal can earn a place of
legitimacy, as it likely has, then the easier it will be to secure a peaceful and just future
for Iraq and its citizens.
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V.

CHARTS
A. Chart 1 – Timeline of events for Statute and Government transition
Statute

First statute of IST is
promulgated

Date
15 Nov. 2003

Government
CPA signs an “Agreement
on Political Process,”
outlining the creation and
transition of power for Iraq.

10 Dec. 2003
8 March 2004

•

•

28 June 2004

•
•

30 Jan. 2005
Assembly promulgates new
statute

11 Aug. 2005
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Law of
Administration for
the State of Iraq for
the Transitional
Period (TAL) is
promulgated.
Art 48 confirms
Statute as issued
from 10 Dec. 2003.
Iraqi Interim
Governing Council
dissolves
U.S. hands over
sovereignty to
interim government
(PM Allawi.)

Iraq has elections for
Assembly.
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B. Chart 2 – Timeline of U.N. Security Council Resolutions Regarding Iraq
Resolution

1441

Date
8 Nov. 2002

Description
States that Iraq, “has been and remains in material
breach of its obligations” for weapons inspections.
Demands that “Iraq cooperate immediately,
unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and
IAEA.”
Gives the coalition forces control of Iraq and lifts
sanctions against Iraq.
Creates the U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

1483

22 May 2003

1500
1511

14 Aug. 2003

1546

8 June 2004

1557
1619

12 Aug. 2004

Sets timetable and framework for restoring sovereignty
to Iraq.
Outlines and endorses terms for transfer of sovereignty
to Iraq. Terms create an interim government. Also
specifies UNAMI roles and powers.
Extends the UNAMI for another year.

11 Aug. 2005

Extends the UNAMI for another year.
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